Abstract: This paper discusses the case of securitization in Islamic finance to tease out what is universal and what is specific about this technique. To do this, the paper frames the spatial dispersal of securitization as a form of 'organizational mimicry', which highlights that techniques always rely for their functioning on locally rooted 'cultures of practice', suggesting that successful transplantations require adaptation in both context and technique. This paper adds to the prevalent literature on mimicry a geographical perspective by investigating to what extent this double shift can also be traced in the geo-historical dispersal of securitization in Islamic markets.
Introduction
to undertake such an effort because even a superficial glance at contemporary practices in Islamic securitization markets -for instance, the paying of profits equivalent to interest -suggests the complete opposite of these perceptions. In fact, as the issuance of the Emaar Sukuk on the LSE illustrates, 'Islamic' products are gaining prominence in conventional investment portfolios.
Moreover, this issuance also suggests that evolutions in Islamic markets are in line with the broadscale globalization and financialization of Middle Eastern economies, whereby Gulf international financial centres in particular are becoming regular nodes on global financial flows. This paper then sets out to answer the difficult question of how concepts and practices of 'the Islamic' and 'finance' can be merged. In other words, we aim to analyse how 'Islamic' Islamic finance 'really' is in its contemporary form and what could be the implications of the potential discrepancies or similarities with conventional products, both for the way in which we conceptualize the process of globalization of Gulf financial markets and of financialization itself. To this end the paper focuses on the differences and similarities between standard Anglo-American securitization and securitization Islam style. As such the paper adds to a young but growing body of research on the geographies of securitization, which is geared towards studying how securitization adapts itself to various contexts. Wainwright (2009) spelled out how the technique first ended up in the UK, and how that required subtle adaptation in both technique and legal context. Aalbers et al. (2011) pursued this agenda and focused on residential mortgage backed securitization in the Netherlands, emphasizing in particular the responsive role of regulators to facilitate the growth of the securitization market in the Netherlands. Recently, a couple of agency reports have undertaken similar investigations of securitization in Italy, Denmark, and Australia (Albertazzi et al., 2011; Frankel et al., 2004; Rajapakse, 2005) . The emphasis in these studies is more on what has made securitization in these latter three countries 'safer' than in the US than on the modifications that were required to make it work in the first place.
Here we aim to take the main thrust of such a body of literature on securitization -the basic observation of the 'plurality' of global finance, which also reverberates what Brenner et al. (2010) have called variegated neoliberalism -a step further. One way would be to frame this plurality as a cultural issue that has been described by anthropologists as 'vernacular modernity' or 'multiple modernities'. Following recent anthropological studies that have demonstrated that 'global modernity is always site-specific' (Appadurai, 1996; Eisenstadt, 2000; Knauft, 2002) , our study will suggest that the 'hypermodern' field of finance too appears to be 'plural because in every local site modernity is brought into social existence in a tension-filled relationship between local concerns and global forms of discursive and institutional power' (Pieterse, 2000) . Though clearly relevant, this anthropological point of view, however, mostly operates at the scale of coherent societies and/or cultures and as such plays itself out at a level of abstraction that is too far removed from our empirics to be able account for the specifics of our case. A more fruitful approach, so we contend, is to interpret developments in Islamic securitization markets through the lens of literatures that have put 'organizational mimicry' at the centre of their analysis. As such we will confront research on geographies of securitization with insights that have been generated by the growing social science literature on what is termed 'mimetic isomorphism' in organizational sociology (see DiMaggio and Powell, 1983 for the classic statement).
While based on different theoretical perspectives and using different empirical vignettes to make their point, such a literature demonstrates convincingly that socio-technical assemblages that at first sight appear to be universally applicable in fact require subtle adaptations to be able to 'work' satisfactory in other environments than those of their gestation. For instance, economic historians have shown the impact of contextual changes on the back of detailed empirical investigations of the introduction of new managerial models, demonstrating that the introduction of these models generated unintended negative consequences which had to be repaired, either through adaptations in the models themselves or in the legal, social, cultural environment or both (Djelic, 1998; Zeitlin and Herrigel, 2000) .
Recently this approach has increasingly been applied to account for the attempts by transnational professional elites to construct supranational conventions for accountancy, bookkeeping, financial management and other widely used 'metrics' (Djelic and Quack, 2007) . Geographers have been quick to focus on the variegated spatial articulations of these 'metrics' and their professions, and have investigated the role of MBA's in furthering financial knowledge (Hall, 2006; Hall and Appleyard, 2009) , of legal firms in promulgating a particular view of legal professionalism (Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2009) , the 'construction' of a transnational executive market by headhunters (Beaverstock et al., 2010) as well as the role of analysts and fund managers in 'constructing' global asset categories (Lai, 2006; Sidaway and Bryson, 2002; Sidaway and Pryke, 2000) .
In all of the above instances, the story is basically the same: models, techniques, technologies, administrative conventions, organizational blueprints do not simply consist of standard operating procedures that reduce agents to mere rule takers, but are embedded in mostly implicit and mostly local cultures of practices that either have to be imitated or reworked into the mimetized artefact to make them function, conceptually transforming agents from pure rule takers into partial rule makers.
As our case on Islamic securitization will show such processes are fundamental in contemporary practices of global finance. To make our point the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides quantitative background information on the growth of the sukuk market. Section three traces the spatial history of securitization in the Islamic world through a qualitative description of the different sukuk markets. The fourth section then presents in more detail the case of the Emaar Sukuk to demonstrate the spatial and content-wise interconnectedness of Islamic finance with mainstream financial players and markets. Section five discusses the differences and similarities of Islamic sukuk structures with Anglo-American securitization, framing it as an instance of organizational mimicry and asking how to weigh what is different and similar. The final section wraps up and draws some tentative conclusions from this study for the remit of economic geography and the kind of crossdisciplinary dialogues it should engage in post crisis.
Size and scale of the sukuk market
Throughout the Islamic world, Islamic finance is growing as a set of powerful discourses and practices that mediate integration into global financial circuits (see Bassens et al., 2010a) . Drawing on Shari'a Law, Islamic finance renounces all interest (riba), gambling (maysir) and contractual ambiguities (gharar) that lead to excessive risk taking. It also shies away from investment in certain products (e.g., pork meat, weaponry, alcohol, etc.) that are considered haram. Fundamentally, Islamic finance opposes the conventional debt-trading and promotes a system of profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) as the main regulatory mechanism of financial intermediation (Pollard and Samers, 2007) . As was spelled-out elsewhere (Bassens et al., 2011a) , the growth of Islamic finance was strongly fuelled by the combination of the Middle East oil boom and a broad reassertion of Islam in Muslim societies from the 1970s onward. Since then Islamic finance has been around, but it is only since the turn of the millennium that Islamic markets are expanding and globalizing rapidly -an evolution no doubt related to wider geo-economic shifts epitomized by the rise of emerging economies in 'the East' (Derudder et al., 2011 , Taylor et al, 2009 ).
As Islamic markets 'mature', they are increasingly confronted with the need for financial products and mechanisms that enable Islamic financial institutions to operate on a global scale. In 'conventional' debt-based markets, assets-backed securities (ABS), mortgage-backed securities (MBS), collateralized debt obligations (CDO), and other products of structured finance have played a crucial role in integrating markets, mainly from the early 1980s onwards. According to Leyshon and Thrift (2007) , the technique of securitization became popular for mainly three reasons. First, it allowed firms to access capital markets directly instead of receiving finance through bank loans. Second, large institutional investors such as pension funds were actively searching for products to diversify their portfolios. Third, and crucially, securitization was propelled by the financial sector's preoccupation to transfer liabilities off-balance. This enabled them to circumvent capital ratio's imposed by the Basel I and II agreements, which limited the size of outstanding loans vis-à-vis equity capital and thus the bank's ability to make profits and pay out bonuses (Aalbers et al., 2011) . Crucially, the resulting products were increasingly being traded across the globe, creating deep and liquid secondary markets.
Islamic markets, on the other hand, are relatively young and illiquid. As they evolve and globalize, however, they seemingly relive evolutions that took place in debt-based markets. Like in 'conventional' markets disintermediation through securitization offers cheaper finance and longer maturity terms than bank loans. Islamic bankers and regulators are therefore actively looking for ways to build a more active (in terms of trade) and integrated market. There are, however, at least three idiosyncrasies that drive the demand for Islamic securitization. First, there is a pressing need for investment products -perhaps even more than in 'conventional' markets because of excess liquidity in key Islamic markets. Especially in the Gulf, oil-rich sovereign and private investors are looking for attractive investment products (e.g., securities, commodities, investment notes) with a Shari'acompliant character. These investors are either Islamic private financial institutions such as takaful (Islamic insurance) companies and investment funds, but also various oil-based sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), which are not 'Islamic' per se. For instance, the largest SWF in the Gulf, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), has an estimated asset value of US$875 billion (Behrendt, 2008) . The mere size of these amassed assets has attracted international service firms, such as investment banks and law firms to the home-bases of this and other SWFs (e.g., Abu Dhabi, Doha, Dubai), in their attempt to capture a share of the business (Clark et al., 2010a) . Second, the rapid growth of Gulf cities and related infrastructure and real estate developments is driving the need for finance products. These projects constitute an attractive market for regional and global investors (e.g., UK or American investment banks, see Bassens et al., 2010b) and serve as the feedstock for Islamic securitization chains. Third, Islamic intermediaries themselves are in urgent need for liquidity management (LM) tools, which could be found in securitization products. In the conventional system, banks can perform LM through short-term interest-bearing loans. Islamic banks, however, cannot access these debt-based markets (because of the riba prohibition) and the sector itself lacks a developed inter-bank market. Currently, LM mostly happens via the tawarruq mechanism at the London Stock Exchange, a hiyal (stratagem) whereby short-term lending is circumvented through the buying and on-the-spot selling of precious metals. Although this structure is Shari'a-compliant in form, it does not address the need for products and techniques that provide Shari'a-compliance in substance, thus reproducing the need for proper 'Islamic' techniques.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
In response to these caveats, financialization techniques such as Islamic securitization have emerged since the 1990s, resulting in an array of sukuk structures, which are basically Islamic asset-based or asset-backed investment notes (Jobst, 2007) . These structures are increasingly connecting localized assets such as real estate projects in Gulf cities with global financial circuits. As illustrated in Figure   1 , the global sukuk market has been growing at a steady pace since the turn of the millennium, both in terms of size and number of issuances, only to be withheld briefly during the 2008-2009 crisis. This temporary fall-back in itself illustrates the highly globalized nature of Islamic markets, with issuers suffering from low investment appetite at the time. However, this dip in sukuk issuance was also related to more 'local' events such as the Dubai debt crisis, which tipped off in 2009, almost leading to the default of Nakheel's US$4 billion sukuk (Bassens et al., 2010b) . Furthermore, as will be detailed below, the sukuk dip was also closely related to an existential crisis in the Islamic finance sector, triggered by the AAOIFI 1 president Taqi Usmani fatwa on the non-Shari'a-compliant nature of most sukuk on the market. Recent issuance levels, however, are surpassing pre-crisis highs.
As per June 30, 2009 the total amount of outstanding sukuk equalled US$136 billion (IIFM, 2010) .
Most of these sukuk, that is ca. US$101 billion, are so-called 'domestic' issuances denominated in local currencies, aiming to attract investors at the national or regional scale. The other US$35 billion, however, are 'international', mostly dollar-denominated designed to attract investors from outside the national or regional realm. This global investor break-down suggests that sukuk are gaining popularity, not only with Muslim investors, but also with non-Muslim investors who seek to diversify their investment portfolios. As illustrated in Table 1 , Malaysia is dominating domestic issuance, while the Gulf is leading the way in terms of international sukuk. For reasons of Shari'a-compliance, which favours investment in the 'real' economy, sukuk finance in both regions has an intimate link with 'tangible' assets, either in real estate and property development, large infrastructure works (highways), industrial infrastructure (petrochemical sector), or infrastructure with a focus on building global connectivity (e.g., airlines, port operations, etc.).
[Insert Table 1 [Insert Table 2 about here]
As illustrated in Table 2 , the resulting data set contains information on the nature of the financed projects, the identity of the seller, the arranger/manager of the issuance (e.g., global banks or regional Islamic banks), and the place of listing on international markets. Reviewing the entire data set produced further insight in the geographical market differences between the two heartlands of sukuk issuance, Malaysia and the Gulf. In Malaysia, sukuk are often state-based initiatives to finance these large infrastructural works through national investments in ringgit-denominated sukuk. Dubai, LSE, Luxembourg SE, Tadawul, etc. These listings, however, do not imply active trading since most sukuk are held until maturity, making secondary markets illiquid to almost non-existent.
The existence of such spatial variegation in sukuk markets is closely related to the geo-historical evolution of Islamic securitization itself, a topic to which we turn in the next section.
A geo-historical account of Islamic securitization
The overview in the previous section has banned the possible misconception of viewing the sukuk market as a robust and well-integrated 'entity'. In fact quite the contrary is actually the case: Not only do sukuk markets show intense geographical variegation, they also vary greatly in terms of underlying contracts. As defined by Article 2 of AAOIFI's Shari'a standards, sukuk are "certificates of equal value representing undivided shares in ownership of tangible assets, usufruct and services or (in the ownership of) the assets of particular projects or special investment activity". In practice this definition is more a rule of thumb than a crisp legal constraint, since very few issued sukuk actually live up to this definition. According to Shari'a scholar Mohammad Daud Bakar (2010) sukuk can be broadly divided in four categories, depending on their product design, product offering, pay off to investors, and rating methodology, which contrast with the above-suggested uniformity. They can be identified as either: (i) debt-based; (ii) asset-based; (iii) project-based; or (iv) asset-backed sukuk.
Chronologically, there has been a general trend away from the first debt-based category, towards the latter, with asset-backed securitization as the most recent innovation in the field of Islamic securitization. With each new step, the assets that underlie the structure gain importance in terms of being the actual source of revenue for the sukuk investors.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 provides a brief overview of how sukuk markets have evolved since the early 1990s, and how this 'travel log' was accompanied by geographical dispersal. Sukuk have evolved gradually to comprise a vast and variegated array of products that vary in terms of structure, securitized assets, and underlying contracts. A first and crucial development for the opening-up of Islamic markets to securitization was the decision of the Jeddah-based Islamic Fiqh Academy in 1988 that assets could to be bundled and represented by a bond, which could then be sold at market price, provided "the group of assets, represented by the security, consists of a majority of physical assets and financial rights, with only a minority being cash and interpersonal debts" (www.fiqhacademy.org, accessed September 20, 2010). Islamic markets, however, only gradually opened-up to securitization following the blessing of the influential voices of Shari'a scholars at the Fiqh Academy. Not the Gulf Region, but Malaysia, which is usually considered more lenient in its interpretation of Shari'a Law, was the first to experience the introduction of securitization. The first sukuk were issued there in 1990 by Shell MDS (also Global Oil Corp.) and were structured as Islamic debt of RM125 million (ca. US$30 million) based on receivables securitization (bai' bithamin ajil, BBA) (Thomas et al., 2005, 159) . The structure consisted of a deferred payment sale at a pre-agreed price with a profit margin agreed by both parties, which made it in essence a mark-up product similar to a conventional bond. and Saudi Arabia (Wilson, 2004) . Notwithstanding their success in Malaysian markets, debt-based structures such as BBA were considered unacceptable in the Gulf because of their similarities with debt-based bonds. As they entered Gulf markets, sukuk had to accommodate to stricter Shari'a interpretations and were actively moulded by the teams of lawyers and bankers that structured the deals. This was because while the contracts proper that underpin debt-based structures were considered Shari'a-compliant (e.g., murabahah (cost-plus financing), ijarah (lease), or istisna'a (manufacturing contract)), the overarching sukuk structure was not, since the investors receive fixed payments that originate from the underlying contracts. Mainly from 2006 onwards, then, two 'innovations' have been introduced in Islamic markets to structure sukuk more according to the profitand-loss-sharing principle, rather than using sukuk as a formal way to circumvent the Shari'a ban on debt-selling. These are project-based sukuk and 'classic' asset-backed securitization (ABS) structures.
Both structures involve 'true securitization', without a fixed pay or no guaranteed return at the time of dissolution. In case of project-based sukuk the underlying contract is generally an istisna'a (manufacturing contract) or musharakah (diminishing partnership), and the pay-off to investors is to a degree related to the performance of the underlying assets. In asset-backed sukuk, which are usually based on mudarabah (passive partnership) or musharakah structures, the performance of sukuk is entirely linked to the real value and risk of the underlying assets (Daud Bakar, 2010), thus being completely in line with the PLS principle. Ironically, however, the Dubai debt crisis has shown that even real assets can be the object of intense speculation, making the build-on financial instruments equally speculative. Moreover, notwithstanding the discussed geo-historical developments towards true ABS, the most common (although also controversial) securitization technique in globalized Gulf markets still involves selling assets to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) and leasing them back via a socalled sukuk al-ijara -a technique that we will discuss in more depth in the next section. this issuance Emaar has managed to raise the targeted US$500 million, which understates the success of the sukuk since they were oversubscribed more than three times (US$1.7 billion), echoing the success of pre-crisis issuances arising from the Gulf -a sign that investor confidence towards Dubai is apparently restored.
[Insert Figure 3 about here] Figure 3 , which we retrieved from the issuance prospectus (downloaded from www.londonstockexchange.com, May 20 th , 2011), presents a basic and highly simplified view of the underlying securitization structure. In essence the structure presented here is centred on an ijarah saleand-lease-back operation, between the obligor Emaar Properties PJSC which sells assets to a bankruptcy-proof SPV, the issuer Emaar Sukuk Limited, which issues sukuk and sells them to the endinvestors (the sukuk holders) to purchase these assets. After this initial sale, Emaar Properties PJSC (lessee) leases the sold assets from the SPV (lessor), generating a cash-flow which is channelled to the certificate holders. When the sukuk mature, the assets are bought back by the obligor and this amount is used to repay the principal amount to the investors. The simplicity and transparency suggested by this securitization structure, however, greatly obscures the multiplicity of actors and institutions involved in the securitization process, and understate the complexity of the multiscalar networks producing and operating even such 'basic' a sukuk structure. Islamic securitization markets, the transnational financial space sustained by such interconnectedness also serves as a platform for transplantation of financial techniques, ideologies, cultures, practices, and discourses. This transplantation is the result of the actions of financial elites, who can wield a set of conventional structured finance techniques, which they mutatis mutandis deploy to capture new and profitable markets. Seemingly sukuk structuring teams are borrowing the blueprint of securitization techniques originating in 'conventional' markets, and are using it as a panacea to find existing or innovate ways around Islamic prohibitions to build Shari'a-compliant products. Indeed, as we will argue in the next section, the above-sketched geographies of 'entanglement' (Callon, 1998; Maurer, 2005) involve a large degree of 'mimicking' of conventional structuring techniques (Khan, 2010) . sukuk structures require operating in multiple legal jurisdictions, some of which are not governed by English law (e.g., UAE law). A superficial glance at the prospectus, however, shows that it is in fact very similar to a 'conventional' prospectus, featuring most of the usual terminology, notices to residents of various countries explaining their non-eligibility as investors, terms and conditions of the certificates, financial information of the obligor, etc. There are some differences, however, including a very transparent and elaborate discussion of the investment risks, which make reference to the risks linked to investing in emerging markets. However, when we skate over these superficial differences and dig deeper into the actual contractual structures supporting the issuance, it becomes obvious that sukuk are essentially very similar to 'conventional' debt-based structures such as bonds, but also vary significantly from structured finance products based on the securitization of income flows known from their role in the recent crisis (see Figure 5 ).
[Insert Figure 5 about here] This is because the structure of the securitization itself is much simpler than in conventional products such as RMBS. For instance, there is no mention of waterfalling or tranching that provides investors with different classes of bonds (equity, mezzanine, senior and super senior tranches) with different credit risk ratings and different interest rates. This overt simplicity strongly suggests that the technique of securitizing assets is used here as a mere stratagem to circumvent Shari'a rules, as they are 'Islamic' in form, but not in substance (Agha, 2009 ). This can be deduced from three observations.
First, in common asset-based structures certificate holders do not receive periodic payments on a variable profit-and-loss sharing basis, but instead receive a fixed interest rate that is often benchmarked to LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate). As for the Emaar sukuk, the trust certificates indeed return a fixed yield of 8.5 %, which makes the revenue for investors completely detached from the performance of the underlying assets. As with conventional debt-based products, then, it is the rating of the seller and not the assets that determines the sukuk rating. This explains why, contrary to a prospectus of 'conventional' securitizations where the emphasis is on the underlying assets, sukuk prospectuses extensively detail the credit status and the background of the obligor. In this case, the obligor Emaar Properties is partially government-owned, which makes that its rating is linked to the overall creditworthiness of the Emirate of Dubai, which is precarious at the moment. Second, the agreement of purchase undertaking (PU) included in the contract, which binds the seller to repurchase the assets at maturity, guarantees the investments of the sukuk holders disregarding the actual performance or value of the underlying assets, and thus violates the PLS principle. Third, in asset-based structures such as the above no 'true' sale occurs, but rather a transfer to the issuer of a collection of 'rights akin to ownership' that allows the issuer to issue sukuk and enables the investor to participate in the revenues generated by the underlying assets. This means that investors have no recourse to assets, making the Emaar sukuk in fact unsecured obligations, which also explains the fixed interest rate paid on the notes. This limited recourse to underlying assets reflects the fact that non-residents are more than often not allowed to own or lease these Gulf assets (Thomas et al., 2005, 158) , which explains why until recently the ijarah approach was usually sufficient to satisfy Shari'a scholars. In November 2007 Taqi Usmani, the president of AAOIFI's Shari'a Board has voiced the critique that sukuk are, in fact, nothing more than conventional debt. As the recent Emaar issuance, however, illustrates this critique has fallen on deaf ears with Islamic finance professionals and their Western handmaidens.
How should we then interpret these similarities and idiosyncrasies of sukuk securitization? Do they This disposition has produced Islamic markets that are strongly marked by rent-seeking first-movers, who are stretching Shari'a rules to fit new and profitable fields such as Islamic securitization, but lately also Islamic credit cards and hedge funds, which seem Shari'a compliant but fundamentally violate 'Islamic' bans on interest, speculation, and excessive risk-taking. This does, however, not imply that mimicry happens in a 'blind' and straightforward fashion, as is suggested by classic stageist modernization narratives (Kerr, 1960; Parsons, 1966; Rostow, 1960; see critically Sheppard, 2011) . Rather, as was illustrated by the geo-historical account of Islamic securitization, these negotiations happen gradually and follow a 'trial-and-error'-logic, thus constituting a complex and iterative process that echoes the kind of 'bricolage' discussed by Engelen et al. (2010) in the context of an analysis of the 'securitization' machine that wrecked Anglo-American finance in the recent crisis.
However, in terms of outcomes, we depart from the 'isomorphism' that DiMaggio and Powell postulate as the telos of mimicry, contending that their homogenizing viewpoint reflected a time (the early 1980s) when scholarly sensitivity to the durability of hybrid effects and outcomes was still in the process of gestation. In fact, the concept of hybridity only moved from evolutionary biology to the social sciences in the mid 1990s, suggesting a gradual departure from the homogenizing assumptions underlying modernization theory (Steinmetz, 2005) . While we have demonstrated that mechanisms of homogenization are indeed at work in Islamic finance, they do not necessarily lead to isomorphism per se. Indeed, in Islamic securitization markets putatively similar tools and stratagems are usednotably the technique of off-shoring via a SPV which is the crux of securitization -but the aims of their employment move beyond the 'regulatory arbitrage' that is behind 'conventional' securitization markets. Rather, it appears that these exact same techniques are being used to circumvent regulations of Shari'a-compliance, thus leading to forms of 'religious arbitrage' instead (see El-Gamal, 2006 ).
In sum, the above account of Islamic securitization suggests, counter to images of 'empire-like' neocolonization that straightforwardly leads to increased homogenization, the emergence of hybrid outcomes. These are mediated not only by financial elites employed by banks and service firms operating from 'global cities' and IFCs, but also mediated by 'local' financial actors such as Shari'a scholars, Islamic bankers, trust managers, regulatory bodies, and others operating from 'local' financial centres. Backed by religious authority and the power of substantive financial leverage (petrodollars), these local power brokers act as emerging markets' 'gatekeepers', bridging and connecting metropolitan and peripheral networks and circuits, and through their trial-and-error negotiations co-producing something that to the outsider appears as financial integration and for the insider feels as opportunistic bricolage (Bassens et al., 2012; Engelen et al., 2010) .
Implications for economic geography
The case-study presented here illustrates how global finance, its narratives, discourses, techniques, and agents, is fundamentally plural. As securitization diffuses through the social pipelines that undergird financial markets and is, through processes of organizational mimicry, introduced in new contexts, the technique, structure, aims, and perceptions of securitization are simultaneously reproduced and altered to serve new contextual goals: religious arbitrage instead of regulatory arbitrage, dodging religious commandments rather than the prescripts of the central bank. This implies that while global finance unmistakably refers back to global discourses and practices, which crosscut national boundaries and transcend regulatory regimes, local and regional institutional variegation still influences and shapes the practice of global finance (Clark, 2005) . Therefore, as Clark et al. (2010b, 3) marked by the absence of a hegemon that possesses the power to enforce upon societies elsewhere its visions of the future, either through hard or soft power (Nye, 2004) . As the World Bank report sketches with regard to monetary policies, suggesting a multicurrency world instead of a world that is dominated by the dollar, our case study too suggests a future of multiple jurisdictions that are increasingly vertically linked, allowing for multiple negotiations of financial agents across the boundaries of those jurisdictions, resulting in highly uneven forms of financial 'bricolage' that break with the simple core-periphery logic that underlies notions of isomorphism and its absence. This means that we need to reconceptualise the world of finance as an increasingly symmetrical field where the ability of agents to set the norm is not determined by country of origin, but by market reputation that might not survive the next crisis. In a flagrant break with Economics 101 textbooks, our case demonstrates that there is no pure form of securitization. Instead there are different regional, national and even local variations, which use seemingly similar techniques to slightly different ends.
As our case study suggest, then, there is a pressing need to go beyond the hidden assumptions of modernization theory writ large which are especially dominant in the discipline of economics, with its pretension of academic neutrality, its positivist ethos and its claim to universal law-like generalizations. Engaging with economics, as is the remit of this journal (Arnott and Wrigley, 2001; Wrigley and Overman, 2010) , could easily seduce geographers to forget the humbling lessons from earlier engagements with the other social sciences. These were lessons of self-reflexivity, complexity, conditional causation and a world that largely escapes quantification and modeling. On the back of this we want to close with hesitantly raising the question whether an ongoing engagement with economics is worth the effort if it requires geographers to endorse its assumptions and mimic its ethos. For not only has it been a one way dialogue -from geography to economics with not much talking back from economists, as has been ruefully noted on a number of occasions in this journal (Brakman et al., 2011; Garretsen and Martin, 2011; Wrigley and Overman, 2010 ) -the crisis too has indicated an urgent need on the side of academic economics to revisit some of its deeply buried core postulates: from its conceptualization of agency to its notion of markets to its empiricist philosophy of science to its politics of top down engineering. We confess to a certain disaffection with the asymmetrical project of gaining the ear of economists. Instead, we would like to suggest to broaden the conversation again and invite cultural anthropologists, organizational sociologists, political scientists (back) to the table -as well as those economists that have demonstrated to put empirical complexity above paradigmatic parsimony (mostly those working in slightly 'tacky' subfields like labor or developmental economics (see Card and Krueger, 1995; Rodrik, 2008) . Indeed, if the crisis has taught us anything it is that we neglect the fact of social complexity at our own peril. That is a lesson that comes easier to geographers than economists.
